It has been common in philosophy to think of concepts as disembodied. Philosophers of science and historians of science often talk disparagingly of concepts as sources of understanding because concepts are assumed to be disembodied. The rejection of this role of concepts has a history that can be traced back to arguments against the kind of history of science developed by historians like Canguilhem, Koyré, Butterfield and others. These historians took concepts as a major source of understanding in history and philosophy of science.  In the third part of the twentieth century, “the new philosophy of science” (associated with Kuhn and Feyerabend), was thought to overcome some issues involved with the emphasis in concepts in the previous generation of historians. The issue was thought to be that reliance on concepts left historiography unable to incorporate the role of institutions, interests, habits and other cultural constraints. According to this view of concepts as disembodied, if concepts are to play a role in history and philosophy of science they have to be somehow "re-embodied" with sociological stuff. But concepts do not need to be “re-embodied” in this way. The cognitive sciences provide several ways in which concepts can be seen as embodied from the very beginning. Concepts are already historical processes and the specific ways in which these historical processes develop is crucial to understanding the dynamics of science.